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BRIEF OF UTAH STATE BAR
NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter is on apoeal from a rulinq by the Board of
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar that the oetitioner has failed to
satisfy the requirement that he be of

~ood ~oral

character, and is

thus denied admission to the Utah State Bar.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Petitioner requests a reversal of the rulinq of the Board
of Commissioners and an

or~er

requirino his admission to the Utah

State Bar.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner presents a recitnl of the facts involved in the
Introduction of his Brief.
hearin~

~ar.

The first oaraaraph therein refers to a

before the Character and Fitness Committee of the Utah State

Since a record of those ~roceedinqs was not made is not before the

Court at this time in the record on apneal, we can only refer to the
notice sent to petitioner, •.<hich states that the named committee
"cannot certify the applicant is of approved aood r10ral character and
Qeneral fitness to practice la\'1."

(Record, p. 36).

This notice also
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advised petitioner of his riCJht to a further :1earinr], 1·1hich ri'lht 1.1as
filin~

exercised by petitioner· by the

of a Fomal RerJUest for Hearinq

with the Executive Director of the Utah State Gar. (Record, o. 35).
Subsequently, counsel for petitioner filed a motion to exclude certain
evidence. (Record,

[1.

any and all evidence

19).

In part, petitioner sought to exclude

pertainin~

to an arrest and conviction which were

later reversed and for which an order of expunnement issued.
part of petitioner's motion was nranted.

This

Petitioner also souqht to

exclude evidence which pertained to the expunged matter, but could be
introduced into evidence without reference to the arrest, etc.
Specifically, the issue was whether or not evidence could be admitted
which was obtained from a search and seizure subsequently declared
illegal under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
in State criminal proceed'ngs.

The Hearinq Officer ruled that this

evidence was admissible.
In the evidentiary
to.

hearin~

the above rulin'ls were adhered

Petitioner rresented evidence as referred to in his Brief - his

testimony and that of three members of Bar who testified as to oetitioner's good character.

Rather than continue the date of the hearing,

the Bar and petitioner stipulated to admission of the testimony of
Larry Hedberg, 11ho could not attend the hearing.
testimony was that in June of 1976 he had observed

Hedber'l'S stipulated
a~oroximatelv

pound of marijuana and a lesser amount of cocaine in the
beinq rented by the oetitioner.

one

a~artment

The Bar also offered as evidence the

application to the Bar of the petitioner. (Exhibit l of transcript).
Petitioner had stated in that aoplication that he had b?en accused of
"smoking pot" in 1963 while in the '·1arine Corps, awl later r·eceived an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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undesirable discharge, which was later
and then to an honorable discharqe.

u~~raded

to a qeneral discharge

On cross examination, each of the

character witnesses offered bv the oetitioner stated that in his or
her opinion, use of marijuana or cocaine is not, bv itself, sufficient
reason to exclude someone from membershia in the Bar, because of lack
of moral character.

EVIDENCE OFFEr.EO BY THE S.l\'1 '.JAS

P~OPERLY

1\DI'IITTEO .1\,'10 DEl 'lOT DE.'IY DETITIO:IER A
FA!~

AriD PIP!'_'\TIAL

HE."'~ I 'I~.

It is true, as stated in Petitioner's Brief, that the Bar's
investi~ator

quent

obtained copies of the arrest, conviction, and subse-

expun~ement

orders of the petitioner.

It is also true that

these materials should not have been orovided bv the court for the
investi~ator.

However, it is not true that this was the only source

of the information which led to denying petitioner admission to the
3ar.

;~o

1vhere in the record is that stated.

investi')ation by the Bar

~1as

To the contrary, the

actuall;• initiated by a call from a

licensed member of the Bar to the Executive 8irector.

Petitioner's

counsel 1·1as informally told of this, but it also does not aopear of
record.
The Bar did not rely on nor even utilize the exounced
matters in the evidentiary hearinq.
allow use of the HedberQ testimony,

The Hearinn Officer did, however,
althou~h

it consisted of observa-

tions durin') a search and seizure later declared illeqal under the
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Fourth Amendment.

This issue was arnued at some length orior to the

evidentiary hearing.

(~ecord, ~~-

The Sar arcued then, and

8-31).

does so aqain, that the exclusionar'; rule as first established in
'la;Jp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1971), is not aoolicable to Gar aorlicant
proceedin~s

so as to prevent use of evidence obtained in a search

later declared

The purpose of the exclusionarv rule is to

ille~al.

deter police officers from coniuctinn illegal searches.

This purpose

is adequately served bv preventinq the use of tainted evidence in
criminal

u.s.

oroceedine~s.

lJ,s stated in United States v. ,lanis, 428

433 (1976):

. . . the "prime purpose of the rule, if not the sole
one is to deter future unla•.-1ful police cond•Jct. . . . in
sum, the rule is a judiciallu created remedy desianed to
safer.Juard Fourth /\mendment rights generally throuqh its
deterrent effect, rather than a oersonal constitutional right
of the oarty aggrieved . . . . as with any remedial device,
the aoplication of the rule has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are thouoht most
efficaciouslv served." at 456, quotin~ United States v.
Calandra, 4H U.S. 338 (1974).
The Court found that the

~oal

of deterrence was sufficientlv served

bv excluding the illeaallv seized evidence in the state criminal
proceedings.

As a result, the evidence was allowed to be used in

Internal '(evenue Service proceedinos.
r~orale

v. Griqel, 422 F".SUt)O. 938

that the exclusionary rule did not

Si:'lilarlv, in the case of

(D.C.~!.H.
aD~ly

1976), the COUl't held

to colleqe disciplinary action

based on evidence of marijuana use obtained in a warrantless search.
In examining the Janis rule, this court stated that "The Supreme
Court clearly intends to limit the exclusi0narv rule to criminal
proceedinas and to allow onlv a crimin3l defendant to invoke its
protections."
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Thus, the Hearing Officer pro~erly found that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable, and that the testimony of Larrv Hedberg
was admissible.

The petitioner had previously been extended the

benefits of the exclusionary rule in the criminal
dismissal and expungement.

proceedin~s

through

He was not entitled to the further aopli-

cation of the rule in the Bar proceedings, which are essentially
civil in nature.
II

THE DECISION OF THE SOARD OF C0i111ISSIONERS
WAS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED HEREIN.
This Court has elucidated the following standard in its
review of Bar disciplinary cases:
This court has previously stated that it would look upon
the findings and recommendations of the Bar Commission
with indulgence and would not disregard its action unless
there was something to persuade this court that the Commission had acted capriciously, arbitrarilv, or beyond
the scope of its power or was plainly in error.
In re Badger, 27 Utah 2d 174, 493 P.2d 1273 (1972).
Presumably, the same standard applies in Bar application cases.
It is clear from the record herein, that the Bar Commission did not
abuse its authority in finding that the petitioner Vias not qualified
for admission to the Bar.
Petitioner's evidence of good moral character consisted
of his own testimony and that of three members of the Bar.

The tes-

timony of petitioner included information about his educational
and employment background. (Tr. pp. 5-6).

He described in some

detail his work as a para-professional law clerk at Utah Legal
Services. (Tr. pp. 6-9).

He denied ever having committed or havin:J
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been accused of coPmlittin'] anv 'lets 1·:hich 1·121'e dishonest or contr.J.l''/
to the Code of Professionill

:~esnonsibil i~·'

in connection 1·1ith his

dealinr1s 1·1ith clients at Lenal Services. (Tr. p. ll-12).
cross examination, the

~etiti0n~r

t~at

further stated

he had not engaged in any activities in his

~ersonal

'Jurino

in his oninion
life in contra-

vention of the code of ethics. (Tr. p. 13).
The three witnesses who testified on behalf

~f

the oetitioner

all had worked with him at Utah Legal Services and all are members

of the Utah State Bar.

Each testified in large oart as to the poeti-

tioner's professional competence.
moral qualifications of the

~one

~etitioner.

addressed soecifically the
In fact, none of them reallv

had much contact with the petitioner outside of their on-the-job
activities.

Thus, petitioner's orima facie case of moral character

consisted only of his own stJtements and those of colleaoues relating
to

:Ji·i:~arily

PI'Ofessiun~l

an:l intellectual carl3bilities.

Cross examination of the three char.J.cter witnesses revealed
that their opinions as to the oualification of the oetitioner were
tainted by their opinions

concernin~

its relationship to Bar membershio.

the use of

ille~al

drurs and

The first witness, 3arney Sesas,

testified as follows:
"!')

[•1r. Gesas, in your ooinion, is a nerson 1·1ho uses
marijuana mor.J.llv fit to be a member of the Utah
State Bar?

A

You're askinc me

Q

In your opinion.

t;

r~y

Q

In your opinion, is a :Jerson 1·1ho uses cocaine

h~00thetically 7

opinion, I •·IOuld SoV I d0n't think that "IOUld
constitute nrornl tun'i tude in cl'' ooi nion ~s a
basis for denial of admissi0n to the Bar.
r~orally
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fit to be a member of the Bar?

A

The question you asked me is if someone uses cocaine
would I deem them fit for admission to the Bar on
the o,rouncls of moral fitness?

Q

Correct.

A

1·1y answer 1'/0ul d be probably. I 1·10ul d have to kn01·1
the totality of the person, their work product.
would 0enerally say, if that was an isolated situation,
that person were known to use cocaine, I would probably
want to explore it more. But I would qenerallv
say I don't think that's a basis to deny admis~ion.
My reason for that is that the use o~ that drug-I'm not personally familiar with it; I have only
read about it--that's a consensual type of action.
Someone is not imposing on others, is not profiting
by it.
I'm not espousing that it should be legal, but
I'm saying I would want to look further into that
person. That alone I would not use as a basis to
deny admission to the Bar.
(Tr. pp. 22-23).

Another witness, James T. Massey, testified as follows on cross:

Q

Mr. Massey, in your opinion is a person who uses
marijuana morally fit to be a member of the Bar?
In your opinion, is a person who uses marijuana
morally fit to be a member of the Bar?

A

That being the sole criterion, a person who has used
it?

Q

Who uses marijuana.

A

It would be difficult without knowing what you
mean "uses."

Q

Smokes marijuana.

A

In terms of frequency. I think a Person-- I'll
answer that question, no, not necessarily. I don't
think it automatically disqualifies peorle from being
fit to practice law the way the question was posed.

Q

In your ooinion, is a person who uses cocaine morally
fit to be a member of the Bar?
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A

\'JOuld hilve thP sa111e ans'.-JC'r."

(T1·. rJp.34-3S).

The last character witness, Potricia De Michele, state1 as follows:
Patty, in you1· Of.Jinion, is a [)erson •.-1ilo uses
marijuana morally fit to be a me~ber of the Gar?

"0

A

In C)eneral?

Q

Yes.

A

Yes , I bel i eve so . \·!ell , I 1·10 ul d qua l i f y t ha t by
sayin~, all things bein~ eaual, that alone ~ould not
in my mind make sor~eone unfit.

0

In your opinion, is a person \vho uses cocaine morally
fit to be a member of the Bar?

A

With the same kind of qualificiltions?

0

Same.

A

Yes."
(Tr. op. 40-41).

The Bar presented the testir10ny of Larrv Hedberg.
\•las unable to

atte~1j

r·lr. Hedberg

the i1earing, but in the interest of havin') the

issue resolved both parties stipulated to the content of that
testimony.

The testimony was as follows:

. . in June of 1976 he was in the apartment of the
applicant, Mr. Kuhnhausen, and in that apartment he
observed approximately one pound of marijuana and a
lesser amount of cocaine. (Tr. p. 42).
Also olaced in evidence by the Bar as Exhibit l, \'Jas the
"Applicant's Questionnaire and Affidavit" filed 1·1ith the Utah State
Bar by the petitioner.

The document was identifiej by the netitioner

as having been filled and signed by him. (Tr.

o~.

12-13).

Ouestion 0

of that document asks for information concerninq service in the
armed forces.

Under a subsection designated "Other details" of

question 3, petitioner states as follows:
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In ,lune 196'3, I1·1as confronted b•; Gli' head :JC') 1·1ho sJid
he kne•:l I smoked "pot". I 1·1as advised bv hin that if
a (sic) sa1·1 a doctor he w1uld not inform th'" C.O. I 1·1ent
to the Naval Hospital the follo1·1ino rn01'nin(l and after
tell ino the d0ctor that I soc1ked (sic) ~~t, he called
r.1v CO.
I \'las then informed that no chanes l'iOuH b2 brou1ht
against me if I would accect an undesireahle discharne.
Two months later I was out of the service. I never had
any disciplinarv or complaints filed against me and other
than this incident my service was exenolary. Subsequentlv
the discharne was unqraded to General and as I understand
it I am eligible for armestv and an honor~hle discharqe.
Petitioner testified that eventuallu he received an honorable iischar0e.
rlo evidence or testirnonv 1·1as oresented to rebut that offered
by the Bar.

Petitioner did not denv that in 1968 he snaked pot or

attempt to explain away by any means the statenent included in his
Bar application.

Petitioner did not deny that in 1976 there

~ere

in his aoartr1ent substantial amo•mts of 111ari.iuana and cocaine.

He

did not even offer an explanation as to why the druos were in his
aaartment.

The Hearin0 Officer and theSar Commission came to the

logical and unrefuted conclusion that the petitioner used

~arijuana

in 1963 1·1hile in the Harine Corps, and used mcrijuana and cocaine in
1376, l'lhile in la\·1 school.
ille~al

druqs during the

It v1as

interi~

reason~ble

to assume that he used

period between 1963 ani 1976.

It

was also reasonable to find that, because of the ouantities of drugs
observed in petitioner's
the drugs for value.
he had amole

a~artment

in 197S, he intended to distribute

ilone of this \'las denied bv petitioner, although

op~ortunitv

to

~o

so.

Petitioner had the burden of establishing ~ood moral character.

Everv applicant for admission to the Bar must establish that

he or she is "of nood "loral character, and must ;Jroduce satisfactory
testi~1onial of qood moral character; . . . "U.C.i\. 73-51-10 (1953) ·

ileither the oetitioner nor an•; of his 1·1itnesses v1ere of the ooinion
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that use of ille1al rlruos constitutes li1ck oF r:m·al character suFficient to

~revent

adr·1ission to oractice la1:1.

Co~nissioners disa~reed.

They concluded

The Board of Bar

th~t

the evidence established

that petitioner "has an attitude of defiance of the linv rather than
a \'lillinqness to ilbide by the la1·1," and that "in failinn to admit the
wron~fulness

of his conduct or offer anv evidence of his rehabilita-

tion strongly

su~nests

that he considers the aforesaid conduct orooer

and therefore has no need for rehabilitation."

(~ecord,

o. G, Conclu-

sions 2 and 3).
The Oath of an Attorney, which everv attornev
oractice in the state of Utah must take and

follo~

ad~itted

to

in practice,

provides in part as follow:
I will sup~ort the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of the State of Utah, and that I will
dischar~e the duties of Attorney and Counselor at Law
\~ith ficiel itv:
I will maintain the respect due to Courts of Justice
and judicial officers;" '(ule Ill, .~evised :Oules of
Cond~"t of the Utah State Rar.

The evidence presented herein irrefutablv established
that Petitioner had possessed, used and possiblv intended to sell,
illegal drugs.

Absent any further evidence, the Board of

Co~~issioners

properly found that the petitioner lacked the requisite 800d moral
character and denied him admission to the Utah State Sar.

CO:ICL US Fl:"-1
The evidence

~resented

by the Bar in the hearino before

the Hearing Officer was nroperlv admitted and oetitioner was qiven
a full and fair hearino.
possessed the necessarv

Petitioner failed to establ is!-] that he
<lOOrl ~1oral

character for adr1ission to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-10Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.

Gar or to refute evidence presented

b'l tr~e

13ar and Soard of Commissioners

of the Utah State Bar properlv denied oetitioner

ad~ission

to the

Bar.
DATED this lst dav of Mav, 1973.
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. ~/4~ 7/: ,/ c/_ -~:~ ." ?'C/'

0

A'·1ELA. T' 'G~EE~NOOD

Attorney for Utah State Bar

MAILIIIG CERTIFICUE

I hereby certify that I mailed t'o'IO true
foregoing document to

~Obert

D.

~oore,

co~ies

of the

Attorney for Petitioner,

at Suite 500, Ten Broadway Buildinn, Salt Lake City, Utah 34101,
postage prepaid this C:c/

dav of ~-lay, 1978.
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